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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
FOX BROADCASTING COMPANY 
INC., TWENTIETH CENTURY FOX 
FILM CORP., and FOX TELEVISION 
HOLDINGS, INC., 
    Plaintiffs, 
  v. 
DISH NETWORK, L.C.C. and  
DISH NETWORK CORP., 
    Defendants. 
)
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
)
Case No. CV 12-04529 DMG (SHx) 
ORDER RE PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION 
FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION  
 
 
[REDACTED VERSION] 
 
 This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction 
[Doc. #41].  Defendants filed an opposition to the Motion on September 4, 2012 [Doc. 
#71].  Plaintiffs filed their reply on September 7, 2012 [Doc. # 79].  The Court held a 
hearing on the Motion on September 21, 2012 and, thereafter, took the matter under 
submission.     
The parties ask this Court to fast-forward Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City 
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 104 S. Ct. 774, 78 L. Ed. 2d 574 (1984), to consider whether 
“PrimeTime Anytime” and “Auto Hop” are merely technological innovations as 
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innocuous as the Betamax video tape recorder (“VCR”) of yore or are instruments of 
infringement causing Defendants to suffer irreparable harm.  On the current record, 
Plaintiffs have not borne their burden of showing that the technologies at issue are the 
latter such that a preliminary injunction is warranted.  For the reasons set forth below, 
Plaintiff’s Motion is DENIED. 
I. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 Plaintiffs, Fox Broadcasting Company, Inc., Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 
and Fox Television Holdings, Inc. (“Fox”), own the copyrights to the television programs 
that air on the Fox Network during the primetime window each night, including Glee, 
The Simpsons, Family Guy, Touch, and Bones (“the Fox Programs”).  See Declaration of 
Sherry Brennan, ¶¶ 2-3, Exh. A [Doc. # 41-12].1  Fox is one of four network broadcasting 
companies that offers television programming over the airwaves by local television 
stations free of charge to viewers.  Id. at ¶¶ 4, 8.  Fox also enters into Retransmission 
                                                                 
1 Dish submitted abundant objections to nearly every piece of evidence filed by Fox [Doc. #65].  
“[I]n the preliminary injunction context, the Court is not strictly bound by all rules of evidence.”  
Ticketmaster L.L.C. v. RMG Technologies, 507 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1102 n.2 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (citing 
Flynt Distributing Co., Inc. v. Harvey, 734 F.2d 1389, 1394 (9th Cir. 1984)).  The Court has considered 
Dish’s evidentiary objections and will address them where necessary.  See also Rosen Entm’t Sys., LP v. 
Icon Enters, Inc., 359 F. Supp. 2d 902, 904 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (exercising discretion to consider 
inadmissible but reliable evidence in the context of a preliminary injunction).  Dish objects to Exhibit A 
of the Brennan Declaration for lack of personal knowledge (Fed. R. Evid. 602) and lack of proper 
authentication (Fed. R. Evid. 901).  The objections are DENIED because Brennan, as Fox’s Senior Vice 
President of Distribution and Development, is an adequate custodian of Fox’s records of copyright 
ownership.  Moreover, given that the parties do not seriously dispute Fox’s ownership of the copyrights 
of the Fox Programs, the Court is satisfied that Exhibit A to Brennan’s declaration, which contains 
copies of Certificates of Registration for a sampling of Fox program scripts, is reliable to establish Fox’s 
copyright ownership for purposes of the present motion.  See Twin Peaks Prod’ns, Inc. v. Publications 
Int’l, 996 F.2d 1366, 1371 (2d Cir. 1993) (finding that the court’s disposition of copyright issues 
regarding popular television show Twin Peaks was “ultimately unaffected” by whether the copyright 
registrations applied to the program’s teleplays, televised episodes, or both); Reply at 7 (Fox could not 
obtain copyright registration of programs as audiovisual works until after they aired, so it obtained 
registration of the scripts).  Given Brennan’s background and position with Fox, she is also qualified to 
discuss Fox’s contractual relationships with other companies in the television market and the market for 
Fox’s programs. 
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Consent (“RTC”) contracts with multichannel video programming distributors 
(“MVPDs”), such as cable, telco, and satellite television providers, which grant the 
MVPDs a license to retransmit the Fox broadcast to consumers through their own 
systems.  See Brennan Decl., ¶ 12.  Some of Fox’s RTC contracts also grant MVPDs 
access to video-on-demand (“VOD”) programs selected by Fox.  Id. at ¶ 14.  In addition, 
Fox enters into separate licensing agreements with companies like Hulu, Apple, Netflix, 
and Amazon that allow consumers to view Fox programs via Internet streaming on their 
computers and mobile devices, either with or without commercials depending on the 
nature of the licensing agreement and the user’s subscription.  Id. 
   Defendants, Dish Network L.L.C. and Dish Network Corp. (“Dish”), are the third 
largest pay-television service provider in the United States.  Declaration of David Shull, 
¶ 2 [Doc. # 61].  Dish provides satellite cable services to over 14 million American 
households.  Declaration of Vivek Khemkha, ¶ 8 [Doc. # 62].  Dish retransmits the Fox 
broadcast to its subscribers via satellite pursuant to an RTC Agreement with Fox.  See 
Shull Decl., ¶ 11, Exh. 3.  Since 1999, Dish has also offered subscribers Digital Video 
Recording (“DVR”), which “allows a subscriber to digitally record television content for 
watching at a later time, which is commonly known as ‘time-shifting.’”  Declaration of 
Dan Minnick, ¶¶ 5, 8 [Doc. # 59]. 
A. The RTC Agreement and the 2010 Letter Agreement 
 Dish’s right to retransmit the Fox broadcast is governed by the RTC Agreement,  
which Fox entered into in 2002 with EchoStar Satellite Corporation, Dish’s former parent 
company and current technology provider.  See Shull Decl., ¶ 11, Exh. 3.  For a 
substantial fee, the RTC Agreement grants Dish a non-exclusive right to retransmit the 
Fox broadcast to its subscribers.  Id. at ¶ 2.  Dish’s rights under the RTC Agreement are 
limited in several ways.  First, the RTC Agreement states that Dish  
shall have no right to distribute all or any portion of the programming 
contained in any Analog Signal on an interactive, time-delayed, video-on-
demand or similar basis; provided that Fox acknowledges that the foregoing 
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shall not restrict [Dish’s] practice of connecting its Subscribers’ video replay 
equipment . . . .   
Id. at ¶ 3(d) (emphasis in original).  Second, the RTC Agreement provides that Dish may 
not, “for pay or otherwise, record, copy, duplicate and/or authorize the recording, 
copying, duplication (other than by consumers for private home use) or retransmission of 
any portion of any Station’s Analog Signal without prior written consent of the Station, 
except as is specifically permitted by this agreement.”  Id. at ¶ 9(a).   
 The parties have amended and supplemented their agreement several times since 
2002 to account for developing technologies and changes in the television market.  See 
Declaration of Michael Biard, ¶ 18 [Doc. # 41-15].2  Most recently, their 2010 Letter 
Agreement addresses, among other things, the parties’ rights and obligations with respect 
to VOD offerings.  Shull Decl., ¶ 14, Exh. 5.  The 2010 Letter Agreement states, “In all 
cases VOD content shall be made available by DISH solely to DISH subscribers of the 
corresponding linear service,” and it lists four specific types of VOD programming.  Id., 
Attach. A, ¶ 9.  Each VOD sub-clause contains a term requiring Dish to “disable fast-
forward functionality during all advertisements.”  Id.  In particular, the 2010 Letter 
Agreement gives Dish the ability to offer “Fox VOD” to subscribers at no additional 
licensing fee, which would allow users to watch primetime programming in a VOD 
format.  Id.  This term contains the added proviso that “Dish acknowledges and agrees 
that . . . fast-forward disabling is a necessary condition to distribution of the Fox 
broadcast content via VOD.”  Id.  According to David Shull, Dish Senior Vice President 
of Programming, Dish “has not been able to” make Fox VOD available to its subscribers 
for largely technical reasons unrelated to the subjects of this litigation.  See Shull Decl., 
¶ 23-24. 
                                                                 
2 Dish objects to this statement based on the doctrine of completeness.  The complete 2004 
agreement and 2010 Letter Agreement appear in the record at Shull Decl., ¶¶ 13-14, Exhs. 4, 5.  The 
Court is satisfied that Biard, as Fox Executive Vice President of Distribution and a signator to the 2010 
Letter Agreement, is qualified to make a statement as to the agreement’s purpose. 
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B. The Hopper, PrimeTime Anytime, and AutoHop 
In January 2012, Dish announced the Hopper Whole Home High Definition Digital  
Video Recorder (“the Hopper”) to its subscribers.  Minnick Decl., ¶ 13.  The Hopper is a 
set-top box (“STB”) with both DVR and VOD capabilities.  Id. at ¶¶ 14, 51.  The Hopper 
is currently only available for consumer use, but it is unique in that subscribers may use 
up to three “Joeys,” or additional boxes, to access programs saved on the Hopper on 
additional televisions in their homes.  Id. at ¶ 14.  The Hopper also works with the “Sling 
Adapter,” which allows subscribers to view Hopper content on their computers and 
mobile devices via the Internet.  Id. at ¶ 83.  The Hopper arrived on the market for 
consumers in March 2012 and, as of August 2012,  
 out of a total of 
approximately 13.5 million Dish accounts that use STBs.  Id. at ¶¶ 8-9. 
 Because the Hopper was designed to service multiple televisions, it has three 
tuners and a two-terabyte hard drive, which together allow the user to record and save 
more programming at any given time.  Minnick Decl., ¶ 16.  The three tuners permit 
Hopper users to watch or record on three different television stations at once.  Id.  The 
Hopper has the additional unique capability of streaming all four of the major television 
networks on a single satellite transponder, which allows a user to watch or record all four 
network broadcasts while leaving the other two tuners available for recording non-
network programs or watching them on other television sets equipped with a Joey.  Id. at  
¶ 17.   
 In January 2012, Dish also announced a feature called “PrimeTime Anytime” 
(“PTAT”), which became available to Hopper subscribers in March 2012.3  Shull Decl., 
¶ 9.  PTAT allows subscribers to set a single timer on the Hopper to record all primetime 
                                                                 
3  
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programming on any of the four major broadcast networks, including Fox, each night of 
the week.4  Minnick Decl., ¶ 20.  Dish determines the start- and end-time of the 
primetime block each night and, for certain types of programming, may alter the total 
length of the PTAT recording.5  Id. at ¶ 31.  In order to use PTAT, the user must enable it 
from the main menu by clicking “*” on his or her remote control.6  Id. at ¶ 22.  The user 
is led to a set-up screen, where he or she must select “Enable” to activate PTAT.  Id. at 
¶ 23.  Once PTAT is enabled, a new screen appears, and the user may choose to disable 
recordings of certain networks on certain days of the week.  Id.  If the user does not select 
otherwise, the default settings cause the Hopper to record the entire primetime window 
on all four of the major networks, including Fox, every day of the week.7  Id. at ¶ 24.  A 
user may begin watching the recorded programs immediately after PTAT starts 
recording.  Minnick Decl., ¶ 28.  The user may cancel a particular PTAT recording on a 
given day until 20 minutes before the primetime programming begins; at that time, the 
                                                                 
4 The Hopper is only able to record all four network broadcasts through the same transponder 
during prime time hours.   
 
   
5 For example, during the Olympics in July and August 2012, Dish altered the PTAT start- and 
end-times to accommodate certain Olympics programming on NBC.  Minnick Depo., 217:11-21.  
Additionally, Dish designates as primetime any program at least 50% of which falls within the prime 
time window, and that program is then included in that network’s PTAT recording for that evening.  Id. 
at 216:10-18. 
6 The parties devote much argument to the significance of a series of changes to the Hopper 
features that took place on July 20, 2012, including certain default settings.  See Demery v. Arpaio, 378 
F.3d 1020, 1025-26 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Although a suit for injunctive relief is normally moot upon the 
termination of the conduct at issue, such a claim is not moot if there is a likelihood of recurrence.”).  The 
Court has considered these arguments, but for purposes of the Motion, the Court need only examine the 
propriety of the Hopper features in their current form, as Dish has stated that it has no plans to return to 
its pre-July 20, 2012 practices.  Minnick Decl., ¶ 47.  See Polymer Technologies, Inc. v. Bridwell, 103 
F.3d 970, 974 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (noting that, in an infringement action, a preliminary injunction is 
unnecessary where “the non-movant has or will soon cease the allegedly infringing activities”).  
7 Dish considers Primetime to include programs aired between 8 p.m. and 11 p.m. Monday 
through Saturday, and between 7 p.m. and 11 p.m. on Sunday, for the coastal television markets.  
Minnick Decl., ¶ 26.  Primetime airs one hour earlier in the Central and Mountain time zones.  Id.  
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user can no longer cancel the recording for that day but must instead delete it after it is 
completed.  Declaration of David R. Singer, ¶ 45, Exh. L, Deposition of Dan Minnick, 
224:19-225:14 (“Minnick Depo.”) [Doc. # 55].8  According to Minnick, Vice President of 
Software Engineering for EchoStar Technologies, Dish’s technology vendor, the decision 
to limit users’ recording ability in this manner was based on “usability”: because 
cancelling a recording could result in the user inadvertently cancelling an entire night of 
recordings rather than just one program, Dish reasoned that the anti-cancel feature would 
improve users’ experience by protecting against accidental cancellations.  Id. at 193:14-
194:13.  
All PTAT recordings are stored locally on the Hopper in users’ homes, and users 
may access PTAT-recorded shows from a special “PTAT” folder in the “Graphical User 
Interface” (“GUI”).9  Minnick Decl., ¶ 28.  Programs recorded manually by the user via 
DVR are stored in a separate folder called “My Recordings.”  Id. at ¶ 29.  The user may 
select how many days he or she wants to save the PTAT recordings before they are 
automatically deleted.  Minnick Decl., ¶ 24.  Unless the user selects otherwise, PTAT 
recordings are automatically deleted after eight days.  Id. at ¶ 24.  During that period, the 
PTAT recordings are “protected,” so they are not subject to automatic deletion for lack of 
space as are other DVR recordings stored in the “My Recordings” folder.  Id. at ¶ 33.  If a 
user wishes to “delete” a PTAT recording earlier than the pre-selected date, the icon for 
that recording will no longer appear in the PTAT folder and will be unavailable for 
playback; however, the actual recording will remain on the Hopper hard drive until the 
pre-selected deletion date.  Id. at 35.  Similarly, if a user wishes to save a particular 
program for more than eight days, he or she may elect to save a duplicate copy of that 
program in the “My Recordings” folder.  Id. at ¶ 34.  The duplicate copy is not actually 
                                                                 
8 On August 7, 2011, Fox deposed Minnick, who appeared on behalf of Dish pursuant to Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 30(b)(6).  See Declaration of David R. Singer, ¶ 45, Exh. L [Doc. #41-2].    
9 From the user’s perspective, a GUI functions like a menu page, where the user can select what 
he or she wants to do by selecting the corresponding icon.  See Minnick Decl., ¶ 28 n.1. 
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created until the time for automatic deletion; until then, the icon for the program in the 
“My Recordings” folder is merely a link to the original PTAT recording.  Id.  
Although the Hopper has three “partitions,” or areas of the hard drive where data 
can be stored, all of the audio-visual recordings, both PTAT and traditional DVR, are 
stored in the same partition.  Id. at ¶¶ 43-45.  If a user enables PTAT, the programs take 
up the remaining memory space as they are recorded until it becomes necessary to delete 
previously recorded programs.  Minnick Depo., 170:21-172:10.  At that point, the Hopper 
deletes previously recorded programs in the same manner that a traditional DVR would 
to make room for the new PTAT recordings.  Id.  According to Minnick, prior to July 20, 
2012, Dish “reserved” 231 gigabytes of memory for the PTAT recordings, so the user 
could never use any portion of that memory for other DVR recordings.  Id. at 172:20-6.  
After July 20, 2012, PTAT no longer receives this preferential memory treatment.  Id. at 
172:5-8.  The same partition also contains 329 gigabytes of “reserved” space for “File-
Based Video-On-Demand,” which consists of pay-per-view movies, selected by Dish, 
which Dish anticipates the user might want to order and watch.  Minnick Decl., ¶ 51.  
In May 2012, Dish announced the AutoHop, an additional feature that allows users 
to “skip” commercials in PTAT recordings with the click of their remote control.  See 
Shull Decl., ¶ 10.  If AutoHop is available for a particular PTAT program, the user has 
the option to enable it for that show.  Minnick Depo., 49:18-23.  If the user enables 
AutoHop, the Hopper automatically skips commercial breaks during that program.  
Minnick Decl., ¶ 54.  Although the user may see the first few seconds and last few 
seconds of the commercial break, the bulk of the commercials are replaced by a kangaroo 
icon telling the user that the AutoHop is skipping the commercials.  Id.  AutoHop is 
available only for PTAT recordings, but users can use the standard “30-second skip” 
feature on other DVR recordings to fast-forward.  Id. at ¶ 58. 
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  These copies 
remain at the uplink facility and are used for quality assurance (“QA”) only.  Id. at 38:16-
17.  A technician views the recording, fast-forwarding through the program itself to the 
commercial breaks, to ensure that the marking announcement is accurate and no portion 
of the program is cut-off.  Id. at 47:12-49:22.  If the QA copies reveal an error in the 
marking process, technicians can correct the error on a later broadcast to ensure that 
AutoHop functions properly for users who enable it.  Id. at 50:1-10.  If there is not 
enough time to correct a marking error before the last broadcast ends, then AutoHop will 
not be available for that particular show.  Id. at 50:12-14.  Unlike PTAT, AutoHop does 
not become available to the user until 3:00 A.M. Eastern Standard Time.  Id. at 52:22-23. 
On May 24, 2012, Fox filed a Complaint against Dish in this Court alleging that 
PTAT and AutoHop infringe on Fox’s copyrights and constitute a breach of the RTC 
Agreement and the 2010 Letter Agreement [Doc. #1].  Fox filed a motion for a 
preliminary injunction to enjoin Dish from operating, distributing, selling, or offering to 
sell any version of PTAT or AutoHop or any comparable features [Doc. #41].   
II. 
LEGAL STANDARD 
 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 governs the issuance of preliminary 
injunctions.  The purpose of such injunctive relief is to preserve the rights and relative 
positions of the parties, i.e., the status quo, until a final judgment issues.  See U.S. Philips 
Corp. v. KBC Bank N.V., 590 F.3d 1091, 1094 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Univ. of Tex. v. 
Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395, 101 S. Ct. 1830, 68 L. Ed. 2d 175 (1981)).  An injunction 
is an exercise of a court’s equitable authority, which should not be invoked as a matter of 
course, and “only after taking into account all of the circumstances that bear on the need 
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for prospective relief.”  Salazar v. Buono, __ U.S. __, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1816, 176 L. Ed. 
2d 634 (2010). 
 A plaintiff seeking injunctive relief must show that (1) it is likely to succeed on the 
merits; (2) it is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) 
the balance of equities tips in its favor; and (4) that an injunction is in the public interest.  
Toyo Tire Holdings of Ams. Inc. v. Cont’l Tire N. Am., Inc., 609 F.3d 975, 982 (9th Cir. 
2010) (citing Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 55 U.S. 7, 20, 129 S. Ct. 365, 
374, 172 L. Ed. 2d 249 (2008)).  An injunction may also be appropriate when a plaintiff 
raises “serious questions going to the merits” and demonstrates that “the balance of 
hardships tips sharply in the plaintiff’s favor.”  Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 
632 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting The Lands Council v. McNair, 537 F.3d 
981, 987 (9th Cir. 2008)). 
III. 
DISCUSSION 
A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits 
Fox contends that it is likely to succeed on the merits of its claims against Dish for  
breach of contract, direct copyright infringement, and derivative copyright 
infringement.10  At the outset, the Court notes that the parties’ relationship is primarily a 
contractual one, governed by the RTC Agreement and the 2010 Letter Agreement.  “A 
licensee infringes the owner’s copyright if its use exceeds the scope of its license.”  
Adobe Sys. Inc. v. One Stop Micro, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1092 (N.D. Cal. 2000) 
(quoting S.O.S., Inc. v. Payday, Inc., 886 F.2d 1081, 1088 (9th Cir. 1989)).  Indeed, Fox’s 
contract claims overlap substantially with the issues raised by its copyright claims, and 
therefore a breach of contractual terms governing Dish’s rights to use the copyrighted 
                                                                 
10 Fox’s Complaint also raises a claim for breach of contract involving Dish’s Sling Adapter, as 
well as a claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  See Complaint, ¶¶ 80, 
82-85.  Notwithstanding these alternative theories of liability, the Court focuses its present analysis 
solely on the issues briefed by the parties on this Motion. 
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works also constitutes infringement.  See Sun Microsystems, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 81 
F. Supp. 2d 1026, 1031 (N.D. Cal. 2000).  Nevertheless, due to the unique juxtaposition 
of the contract and copyright claims in this motion for preliminary injunction and the 
importance of the Sony case to the Court’s analysis, the Court will examine PTAT and 
AutoHop through the lens of copyright law before proceeding to the contract claims.  
1. The Derivative Copyright Infringement Claims 
Fox contends that Dish induces, contributes to, or is vicariously liable for the  
infringing acts of its subscribers.  “One infringes contributorily by intentionally inducing 
or encouraging direct infringement, and infringes vicariously by profiting from direct 
infringement while declining to exercise a right to stop or limit it.”  Metro-Goldwyn-
Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 930, 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2776, 162 L. 
Ed. 2d 781 (2005).  To establish liability on a derivative-infringement theory, then, Fox 
must first establish that “there has been a direct infringement by third parties.”  See 
Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1169 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing A&M 
Records, Inc. v. Napster, 239 F.3d 1004, 1013 n.2 (9th Cir. 2001)).  Absent a third-party 
act of infringement, a defendant cannot be liable for derivative infringement.  Id.   
 The Court’s analysis of Fox’s derivative claim is guided by the United States  
Supreme Court’s seminal decision in Sony.  In Sony, owners of television and film 
copyrights brought derivative—not direct—infringement claims against Sony following 
its release of the Betamax VCR.  464 U.S. at 420.  The copyright owners alleged that 
individual consumers’ use of the VCR to record their works from broadcast television 
constituted direct copyright infringement and rendered Sony liable under a derivative 
infringement theory.  Id.  The Supreme Court rejected the plaintiffs’ claims.  Id. at 456.  
The Court noted that secondary liability was appropriate only if the defendants had “sold 
equipment with constructive knowledge of the fact that their customers may use that 
equipment to make unauthorized copies of copyrighted material.”  Id. at 439.  The Court 
noted that “the sale of copying equipment . . . does not constitute contributory 
infringement if the product is widely used for legitimate, unobjectionable purposes.”  Id. 
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at 789.  The vast majority of VCR users made copies for private time-shifting purposes, 
and there was no evidence that this practice decreased television viewing or adversely 
impacted the value of the copyrighted works.  Id. at 423-24, 454-55.  The Court 
concluded that the VCR’s primary application—time-shifting for private home use—was 
a fair use and therefore Sony was not liable for derivative infringement.  Id. at 454-56.  
Importantly, Sony addressed only derivative claims; the plaintiffs in that case did not 
claim that Sony directly infringed any of their exclusive rights.  See id. at 434.   
 Here, the parties agree that the Hopper is only available to private consumers and 
the evidence does not suggest that consumers use the PTAT copies for anything other 
than time-shifting in their homes or on mobile devices.  In fact, Fox has identified no 
specific theory under which individual PTAT users could themselves be liable for 
copyright infringement without circumventing Sony.  In the absence of any evidence of 
such direct infringement on the part of PTAT users, Dish cannot be responsible for 
“intentionally inducing or encouraging direct infringement,” or for “profiting from direct 
infringement while declining to exercise a right to stop or limit it.”  Grokster, 545 U.S. at 
930.  In Grokster, unlike this case, owners of a peer-to-peer file-sharing program were 
liable for derivative copyright infringement because they knowingly and intentionally 
induced users to copy and distribute copyrighted works over the network, which 
indisputably constituted infringement on the part of the users.  Id. at 939-41.  Here, the 
record is devoid of any facts suggesting direct infringement by PTAT users.  Fox has 
therefore failed to establish a likelihood of success or to raise serious questions on the 
merits of its derivative infringement claims. 
2. The Direct Copyright Infringement Claims 
Having determined that Dish cannot be liable for infringement on a derivative  
theory, the Court turns next to Fox’s direct infringement claims.  To establish a claim for 
copyright infringement, Fox must demonstrate (1) ownership of a valid copyright and (2) 
infringement of one of the exclusive rights granted to copyright holders under 17 U.S.C. 
§ 106.  See Perfect 10, Inc., 508 F.3d at 1159 (quoting Napster, 239 F.3d at 1013).  Direct 
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infringement does not require intent or any particular state of mind.  Religious Tech. Ctr. 
v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1367 (N.D. Cal. 1995) 
(“Netcom”).  At issue here are the exclusive rights of reproduction and distribution.  See 
17 U.S.C. §§ 106(1), (3).   
  a. The Reproduction Right 
 To establish infringement by reproduction, the plaintiff must show (1) ownership 
of the copyright and (2) a copying by the defendant.  See Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 
F.3d 811, 817 (9th Cir. 2002).  A plaintiff need not demonstrate the defendant’s intent to 
infringe the copyright to establish infringement, UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Disco Azteca 
Distributors, Inc., 446 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1172 (E.D. Cal. 2006), but it must establish that 
the defendant “actively engage[s]” in the copying, Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, 
Inc., 213 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1168 (C.D. Cal. 2002).  Here, Fox has established ownership 
in at least some of the copyrighted programs by submitting copyright registrations for the 
scripts of sixteen episodes of programs that air in Fox’s primetime window.  See Brennan 
Decl., ¶ 3, Exh. A.  Moreover, Dish concedes that copies of the Fox Programs are made 
in furtherance of both PTAT and AutoHop.   
i. The PTAT Copies 
First, when enabled, PTAT makes copies of the Fox primetime broadcast each 
night.  Dish asserts that the user, not Dish itself, is responsible for these copies just as the 
user of a VCR or traditional DVR is responsible for the copies he makes at home on his 
personal machine.  If this is true, then Dish cannot be liable for direct infringement.  See 
Sony, 464 U.S. at 455; Netcom, 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1372 (N.D. Cal. 1995).  If this is not 
true, and Dish in fact makes the copies, then the copies are infringing unless they are 
subject to an exception.  See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., 796 F.2d 
1148, 1151 (9th Cir. 1986).  Thus, the Court turns to the threshold question:  Who makes 
the copies? 
 In Netcom, a disgruntled former member of the Church of Scientology posted 
portions of the church’s copyrighted works on an online forum to which he gained access 
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through Netcom, then a large Internet access provider in the United States.  907 F. Supp. 
at 1366.  The messages were stored on the online forum operator’s computer, 
automatically copied onto Netcom’s computer, and then distributed to users’ computers.  
Id. at 1367.  Netcom did not monitor or control the content or postings, although it could 
have done so.  Id. at 1368.  Finding that Netcom was not liable for direct infringement of 
the church’s copyrights, the court stated, “[a]lthough copyright is a strict liability statute, 
there should still be some element of volition or causation which is lacking where a 
defendant’s system is merely used to create a copy by a third party.”  Id. at 1370.  The 
court analogized to a copying machine, reasoning that Netcom’s act of designing a 
system that allows users to copy materials “is not unlike that of the owner of a copying 
machine who lets the public make copies with it.”  Id. at 1369.  The owner, reasoned the 
Court, does not infringe by merely making his machine available, even though some of 
his customers use it for infringing purposes.  Id.  The court concluded that, while it was 
clear that the former church member engaged in infringement, Netcom’s involvement in 
the copying by acting as a conduit did not expose it to direct liability.  Id. at 1372.   
Importantly, the Netcom court found that Netcom was subject to the “usual strict 
liability scheme that exists for copyright,” but it acknowledged that the unique 
characteristics of the technology at issue required deeper inquiry into who caused the 
copies to be made.  See id. at 1369 n.12.  Several courts have adopted this causation test 
to determine whether various types of Internet service providers and computer programs 
are directly liable for infringing activities carried out on their systems or programs.  See, 
e.g., CoStar Group v. LoopNet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 550 (4th Cir. 2004) (Internet service 
provider not directly liable for providing system by which users could upload some 
copyrighted photographs to its website);  Field v. Google, 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1115 
(D. Nev. 2006) (Internet search engine not directly liable for automatic copying made 
during the engine’s “caching” process); Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc., 213 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1168-69 (Internet age-verification website not directly liable where affiliate 
websites engaged in infringement); Sega Enters. Ltd. v. MAPHIA, 948 F. Supp. 923, 932 
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(N.D. Cal. 1996) (electronic bulletin-board operator not directly liable where users made 
infringing copies by uploading to or downloading from the bulletin board).  In LoopNet, 
the Fourth Circuit read Netcom as setting forth the rule that, in cases where the identity of 
the copier is at issue, there must be “a nexus sufficiently close and causal to the illegal 
copying” to conclude that the owner of a machine used by others for illegal copying 
directly infringes.  LoopNet, 373 F.3d at 550.   
Most recently, the Second Circuit applied this causation test to a “remote-storage 
DVR system” (“RS-DVR”) that allowed customers to record cable programming on 
central hard drives housed and maintained remotely by the defendant, Cablevision.  
Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 124 (2d Cir. 2008) 
(“Cablevision”).  In simple terms, users could request that a particular program be 
recorded, and Cablevision’s system created a data store that the user could access later to 
view the requested program at home.  Id. at 124-25.  Cablevision’s service, according to 
the court, bore similarities to both VOD and DVR.  Id. at 125 (“RS-DVR . . . closely 
resembles a VOD service, whereby a cable subscriber uses his remote and cable box to 
request transmission of content, such as a movie, stored on computers at the cable 
company’s facility.  But unlike a VOD service, RS-DVR users can only play content that 
they previously requested to be recorded.”).  The court also noted that Cablevision 
maintained some control over the content available for recording, because customers 
could “only record programs on the channels offered by Cablevision,” and because 
Cablevision could “modify the system to limit the number of channels available and 
considered doing so.”  Id.   
Acknowledging that Cablevision’s system undoubtedly resulted in copies being 
made, the court began its analysis with this inquiry:  “The question is who made this 
copy.  If it is Cablevision, plaintiffs’ theory of direct infringement succeeds; if it is the 
customer, plaintiffs’ theory fails because Cablevision would then face, at most, secondary 
liability.”  Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 130 (emphasis in original).  Relying on Netcom, the 
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court looked to “the volitional conduct that causes the copy to be made.”  Id. at 131.  To 
make this determination, the court noted that  
a significant difference exists between making a request to a human 
employee, who then volitionally operates the copying system to make the 
copy, and issuing a command directly to a system, which automatically 
obeys commands and engages in no volitional conduct. 
Id. at 131.  The latter is similar to the proprietor of a copy shop, who does not infringe by 
merely making his copy machines available to the public for private, perhaps infringing, 
copying.  Id. at 132 (citing Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., 99 F. 3d 
1381, 1384 (6th Cir. 1996)).  The court analogized its own inquiry to the doctrine of 
causation-based liability in tort, which places liability on the actor “whose ‘conduct has 
been so significant and important a cause that [he or she] should be legally responsible.’”  
Id. at 132 (quoting W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 42 at 273 (5th 
ed. 1984)).   
The court concluded that Cablevision was not directly liable for copyright 
infringement because its involvement in the copying did not pass this causation-based 
test.  Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 132.  In doing so, it found that Cablevision’s “continuing 
relationship” with its customers, its control over recordable content, and its development 
of the instrumentality used for copying was secondary to the fact that the user, and not 
Cablevision, actually initiated the copies.  Id.   
In this case, Fox asks this Court to find that, through PTAT, Dish crosses the 
direct-infringement line that Cablevision’s RS-DVR merely approached.  See 
Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 133.  Fox draws the Court’s attention to several characteristics 
of PTAT that it contends accord Dish an impermissible degree of control over the 
copying process, rendering Dish the copier.  The Court examines each of these PTAT 
features in turn. 
First, Dish decides which networks are available on PTAT and has defaulted the 
PTAT settings to record all four networks.  See Minnick Decl.,¶ 24.  These decisions, 
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while undoubtedly discretionary authority that Dish maintains, are similar to 
Cablevision’s “unfettered discretion” in selecting the programming available for 
recording.  See Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 132 (internal quotation omitted).  As the 
Cablevision court found, these factors are not “sufficiently proximate to the copying to 
displace the customer as the person who ‘makes’ the copies” for liability purposes.  Id.  
Like Cablevision, Dish has no control over what programs Fox and the other networks 
choose to make available during primetime.  If Fox chooses to change its primetime line-
up on a particular night, Dish may allow or disallow the PTAT recording, but it cannot 
control which programs will be broadcast.  See id. at 132 (declining to find liability in 
part because “Cablevision has no control over what programs are made available on 
individual channels or when those programs will air, if at all”).  Moreover, Dish records 
the programs only if the user makes the initial decision to enable PTAT.  Therefore, the 
default settings do not support Fox’s contention that Dish, rather than its users, makes the 
copies.   
Dish also decides the length of time each copy is available for viewing:  PTAT 
recordings are automatically deleted after expiration of a certain number of days, and a 
user may neither delete nor preserve the original PTAT copy before that time.  Minnick 
Depo., 224:19-225:14; Minnick Decl., ¶ 24.  In this respect, Dish exercises more control 
over the copies than did the defendant in Cablevision, where the RS-DVR merely saved 
the copies until they were deleted by the user or overwritten automatically to make room 
for a later-recorded program.  See Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Cablevision Sys. 
Corp., 478 F. Supp. 2d 607, 612 (S.D.N.Y. 2007), reversed in part, vacated in part by 
Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 140.  Nevertheless, it is not clear to the Court that this control, 
being exercised after the creation of the copies, is relevant to whether Dish causes the 
copies to be made in the first place.  In LoopNet, the Fourth Circuit found insignificant an 
Internet service provider’s ability to delete or “accept” copies of photographs uploaded to 
a website before linking them to a corresponding page.  See 373 F.3d at 547.  Instead, the 
court focused its analysis on the “volitional” conduct that caused the copying to be made; 
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the defendant’s subsequent control over the copy did not interrupt the initial chain of 
causation.  Id.  The court noted that the many parties involved in the “storage and 
transmission of data” on the Internet are not truly “‘copying’ as understood by the Act; 
rather, they are conduits from or to would-be copiers and have no interest in the copy 
itself.’”  Id. at 551.  A similar relationship appears to exist between Dish and its 
subscribers:  Dish exercises some control and discretion over the copies, but the copies 
themselves are made by the users who choose to enable PTAT.  Accordingly, the Court 
finds that this factor also does not support Fox’s contention that Dish makes the copies.  
See id. at 555 (holding that “the automatic copying, storage, and transmission of 
copyrighted materials, when instigated by others” does not constitute direct 
infringement). 
On the other hand, Dish decides when primetime recordings start and end each 
night, and it maintains the authority to modify those times according to the particular 
programs airing that night.  Minnick Decl., ¶ 31.  Additionally, the user cannot stop a 
copy from being made during the copying process, but must wait until the recording ends 
before disabling the link.  In this regard, Dish exercises more control over the copying 
process than did Cablevision over the RS-DVR.  Cf. Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 132 (users 
could request a recording of a program or programs airing at any time of day on any 
station, provided that Cablevision had chosen to provide that station to subscribers).  
Unlike the other indicia of control discussed above, these limitations on user choice 
evince Dish’s greater participation in the copying process.  Still, the Court does not find 
that this involvement is materially different from an Internet service provider that copies 
a file in “automatic response to the user’s request,” LoopNet, 373 F.3d at 550, or a DVR 
system that “automatically obeys commands” to copy programs selected by the user, 
Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 131.  Although Dish defines some of the parameters of copying 
for time-shifting purposes, it is ultimately the user who causes the copy to be made by 
enabling PTAT.  Accordingly, while this factor undoubtedly brings Dish closer to the line 
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than its predecessors in Cablevision and LoopNet, it does not push Dish into infringing 
territory. 
 As the Cablevision court noted, “Sony warns us that ‘the lines between direct 
infringement, contributory infringement, and vicarious liability are not clearly drawn.’”  
536 F.3d at 133 (quoting Sony, 464 U.S. at 435 n.17).  It is clear that Dish exercises a 
degree of discretion over the copying process beyond that which was present in 
Cablevision.  Nevertheless, at this stage of the proceedings, the Court is not satisfied that 
PTAT has crossed over the line that leads to direct liability.  Despite Dish’s involvement 
in the copying process, the fact remains that the user, not Dish, must take the initial step 
of enabling PTAT after deciding that he or she wants to initiate the recording.  The user, 
then, and not Dish, is the “most significant and important cause” of the copy.  Prosser 
and Keeton on Torts § 42.  Accordingly, the Court finds that Fox has not established a 
likelihood of success on the merits of its claim that PTAT directly infringes on its 
exclusive right to reproduction.  
ii. The AutoHop Copies 
Dish also makes QA copies of the primetime line-ups to ensure that AutoHop,  
when enabled, functions properly on PTAT recordings.  These copies are indisputably 
initiated by Dish, but the parties dispute whether they are a “fair use” under 17 U.S.C. 
§ 107 because they are “intermediate” to the user’s ultimately fair time-shifting.  See 
Sega Enter. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1518 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding that 
intermediate copying of protected works not ultimately incorporated into an end product 
may be infringing, but concluding that the intermediate copies at issue were a fair use) 
(quoting Walker v. University Books, 602 F.2d 859, 863-64 (9th Cir. 1979)).  The “fair 
use” exception “permits courts to avoid rigid application of the copyright statute when, 
on occasion, it would stifle the very creativity which that law is designed to foster.”  
Kelly, 336 F.3d at 817 (quoting Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 
F.3d 1394, 1399 (9th Cir. 1997)).  Courts consider four factors in the “fair use” analysis:  
(1) the purpose and character of the use; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the 
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amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a 
whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work.  17 U.S.C. § 107.   
First, Dish urges the Court to find that, under Sega and its progeny, the QA copies 
are a fair use because they are ultimately used for noninfringing purposes.  In Sega, the 
court examined whether the unauthorized disassembly of a copyrighted computer 
program “in order to gain an understanding of the unprotected functional elements of the 
program” constituted a fair use.  977 F.2d at 1514.  Sega owned the copyrights to its 
“Genesis” video-game console and games that could be played on it.  Id.  Defendant, 
Accolade, developed a process to render its own games compatible with the Genesis 
console.  Id.  This process included “reverse engineer[ing]” of Sega’s video game 
programs to discover the compatibility requirements for the Genesis.  Id.  The reverse-
engineering process required a form of copying, called “disassembly,” which Sega 
contended was not a fair use.  Id. at 1517.   
Like the QA copies here, the disassembly copies were not used in the end product 
or for any purpose beyond ascertaining the object code, which was not entitled to 
copyright protection.  See id. at 1526.  The court noted, “[w]here there is good reason for 
studying or examining the unprotected aspects of a copyrighted computer program, 
disassembly for purposes of such study or examination constitutes a fair use.”  Id. at 
1520.  In that case, the “good reason” for the copying was to allow Accolade to create 
unique works that could compete in the same market as Sega, and the court noted that 
disassembly was “the only means of gaining access to [the] unprotected aspects of the 
program.”  Id. at 1520, 1523.  Central to the court’s conclusion in Sega was that branding 
disassembly an unfair use would have allowed Sega to monopolize the entire market for 
works of the type created by Accolade.  Id. at 1523-24 (noting that “an attempt to 
monopolize the market by making it impossible for others to compete runs counter to the 
statutory purpose of promoting creative expression and cannot constitute a strong 
equitable basis for resisting the invocation of the fair use doctrine”).  That Accolade 
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copied the unprotected aspects for the purpose of gaining information to create a new, 
competing product rather than to supplant the original work was a significant factor in 
finding fair use.  See also Sony Computer Entm’t, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 
607 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding that disassembly copying was a fair use where employed to 
create a virtual game console on which users could play the plaintiff’s games because the 
end-product was transformative and did not “merely supplant” the plaintiff’s protected 
work).  
Here, Dish makes the QA copies for a purpose fundamentally different than did the 
plaintiff in Sega.  Dish makes copies of protected works and it does not do so in order to 
create unique, transformative works that compete with the Fox Programs.  Furthermore, 
by restricting the use of its copyrighted works, Fox is not exercising an effective 
monopoly over the television-program market.11  See Sega, 977 F.3d at 1523-24.  
Therefore, the Court is not persuaded that Sega resolves the fair use inquiry.  Accordingly 
it will examine the four factors set forth in 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
    (1) Purpose and Character of the Use 
 First, although commercial use of the copyrighted material is not dispositive of the 
fair use inquiry, it can counsel against a finding of fair use, particularly where the work is 
not transformative.  See Kelly, 336 F.3 at 818; see also Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 
Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578-79, 114 S. Ct. 1164, 1177, 127 L. Ed. 500 (1994).  Dish makes 
the AutoHop QA copies to ensure that the marking announcement is correct so that 
AutoHop accurately skips over commercials for PTAT viewers.  While the copies 
themselves are not sold or otherwise monetized, they are undoubtedly made for the 
commercial purpose of providing a high-quality commercial skipping product that more 
users will want to activate.  Moreover, the copies are not transformative because they do 
                                                                 
11 The Sega court also recognized the unique nature of object code in computer programming, 
noting, “[i]f disassembly of copyrighted object code is per se an unfair use, the owner of the copyright 
gains a de facto monopoly over the functional aspects of his work—aspects that were expressly denied 
copyright protection by Congress.”  977 F.3d at 1526.  These unique characteristics are not at play here. 
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not alter their originals “with new expression, meaning, or message.”  Campbell, 510 
U.S. at 579.  The commercial purpose of the AutoHop copies, although not dispositive, 
weighs against a finding of fair use.   
    (2) Nature of the Copyrighted Work 
 Second, “[w]orks that are creative in nature are closer to the core of intended 
copyright protection than are more fact-based works.”  Napster, 239 F.3d at 1016.  While 
some of the programs recorded in the QA process may certainly be fact-based, the sample 
registrations provided by Fox suggest that the programs, which include fictional works 
like Glee and The Family Guy, are primarily creative works.  See Brennan Decl., ¶ 3, 
Exh. A.  Thus, the creative nature of the copyrighted works entitles them to heightened 
protection and also cuts against a finding of fair use.  See Kelly, 336 F. 3d at 820. 
    (3) Amount and Substantiality of Use 
 Third, “copying an entire work” also militates against a finding of fair use.  Kelly, 
336 F.3d at 820.  Where the ultimate use is very limited, however, the factor is given 
little weight.  See Sega, 977 F.2d at 1526-27 (citing Sony, 464 U.S. at 449-50).  Here, the 
QA copies duplicate the Fox Programs in their entirety; indeed, partial copies of the 
primetime broadcast would do little to aid Dish in creating an accurate “marking” 
announcement.  On the other hand, the copies are used for the limited purpose of 
ensuring that the marking data is correct.  Only the marking announcement, and not the 
copies themselves, are distributed to the users.  Thus, while this factor also weighs 
against Dish, it is of considerably less weight than the other factors due to the limited 
nature of the ultimate use.  See id. 
    (4) Effect of the Use on the Market 
Finally, the fourth factor “requires courts to consider not only the extent of market 
harm caused by the particular actions of the alleged infringer, but also ‘whether 
unrestricted and widespread conduct of the sort engaged in by the defendant . . . would 
result in a substantially adverse impact on the potential market’ for the original.”  
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590 (citing 3 M. Nimmer & D. Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright 
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§ 13.05[A][4] (1993)); see also Monge v. Maya Magazines Inc., 688 F.3d 1164, 1182 
(9th Cir. 2012) (“[T]o negate fair use one need only show that if the challenged use 
should become widespread, it would adversely affect the potential market for the 
copyrighted work.”).  The Supreme Court has called this factor “undoubtedly the most 
important element of fair use.”  Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 
471 U.S. 539, 566, 105 S. Ct. 2218, 2234, 85 L. Ed. 2d 588 (1985).  In Hustler Magazine, 
the Ninth Circuit found that this factor focuses on whether the infringing use “tends to 
diminish or prejudice the potential sale of [the] work, tends to interfere with the 
marketability of the work, or fulfills the demand for the original work.”  796 F.2d at 
1155-56 (internal citations and numbering omitted).  Additionally, courts consider the 
effect of the defendant’s use on the owner’s ability to enter into licensing agreements for 
the use of the protected work.  See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 592 (rejecting the argument that 
parody causes cognizable harm to the market for the original work, but noting that “the 
market for potential derivative uses includes . . . those that creators of original works 
would in general develop or license others to develop”); see also Harper & Row 
Publishers, Inc., 471 U.S. at 568 (noting that the fourth factor “must take account not 
only of harm to the original but also of harm to the market for derivative works”).   
Here, the QA copies are used to perfect the functioning of AutoHop, a service that, 
standing alone, does not infringe.  The record shows, however, that a market exists for 
the right to copy and use the Fox Programs:  Fox licenses copies of its programs to 
companies including Hulu, Netflix, iTunes, and Amazon to offer viewers the Fox 
Programs in various formats.  See Brennan Decl., ¶ 13.  In fact, the record suggests that 
Dish chose to offer AutoHop to its subscribers in order to compete with other providers 
who pay for the rights to use copies of the Fox Programs through licensing agreements.  
See Singer Decl., Exh. G (Joe Flint, Dish says Hulu is an issue too, Los Angeles Times, 
May 24, 2012, http://www.latimes.com (“[T]he networks’ growing willingness to offer 
their content on . . . Hulu and iTunes . . . makes the programming that Dish is paying for 
less valuable, Shull said, and that was one of the reasons that it pushed its AutoHop 
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device.”)); see also Notice of Lodging, Exh. 1 at 5:10 (Vivek Khemkha, Dish Vice 
President of Product Management, describing the benefits of AutoHop in a promotional 
spot stating, “I don’t think you’d ever need Hulu Plus or Hulu after this”) [Doc. # 42].12  
Unlike these providers, however, Dish does not pay for the right to copy the Fox 
Programs for any purpose.  By making an unauthorized copy for which it has not paid 
and using it for AutoHop, Dish harms Fox’s opportunity to negotiate a value for those 
copies and also inhibits Fox’s ability to enter into similar licensing agreements with 
others in the future by making the copies less valuable.  Therefore, the Court finds that 
the fourth factor also militates against finding that the QA copies constitute a “fair use” 
under the Copyright Act.  
 Having considered the fair use factors, the Court finds that, on balance, the QA 
copies do not constitute a fair use under the Copyright Act.  Although they are 
“intermediate” copies not ultimately used in any end product, they threaten to reduce the 
value of the right to copy the Fox Programs and undermine Fox’s relationships with 
licensees who pay for that right.  The fact that consumers ultimately use AutoHop in 
conjunction with PTAT for private home use, a fair use under Sony, does not render the 
intermediate copies themselves a fair use as well.  See Los Angeles News Service v. Tullo, 
973 F.2d 791, 797 (9th Cir. 1992) (emphasizing that the defendant’s unauthorized 
commercial copying was not necessarily a fair use merely because his clients used the 
copies for “research, scholarship, and private study,” which themselves are fair uses).  
Therefore, the Court finds that Fox has shown a likelihood of success on the merits of its 
                                                                 
12 Dish objects to these Exhibits as irrelevant, misleading, mischaracterizing the evidence, and 
hearsay.  Neither quoted statement is hearsay as both are statements of an opposing party.  Fed. R. Evid. 
801(d)(2).  The Court finds that the news article and videos themselves, while hearsay, are admissible 
for the limited purpose of showing that the topic itself—the potential effect of AutoHop on both Fox and 
Dish’s relationships with Hulu and iTunes—has been discussed by Dish representatives in the media as 
a potential consequence of AutoHop.  See Ticketmaster, 507 F. Supp. 2d at 1114-15 (considering 
newspaper articles in the context of a preliminary injunction). 
Case 2:12-cv-04529-DMG-SH   Document 118    Filed 11/07/12   Page 24 of 33   Page ID
 #:3560
 -25- 
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
claim that, unlike the intermediate copies at issue in Sega, the QA copies are not a fair 
use and are an infringement upon Fox’s exclusive reproduction right.  
  b. The Distribution Right  
 Infringement of the distribution right requires “actual dissemination of a copy” by 
sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending.  Perfect 10 v. 
Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d at 1162 (internal citation omitted); 17 U.S.C. § 106(3).  In 
the electronic context, copies may be distributed electronically.  See N.Y. Times Co. v. 
Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 498, 121 S. Ct. 2381, 2390, 150 L. Ed. 2d 500 (2001).  Unless a 
copy “changes hands” in one of the designated ways, a distribution has not taken place.  
Atlantic Recording Corp. v. Howell, 554 F. Supp. 2d 976, 983 (D. Ariz. 2008).  
 Here, although Dish is substantially involved in the PTAT copying that takes place 
on users’ individual Hoppers, it does not appear that any actual copies of the copyrighted 
works “changes hands.”  Atlantic Recording Corp., 554 F. Supp. 2d at 983.  A PTAT-
enabled Hopper records primetime programming locally and, at most, that local copy is 
disseminated within a single household through the use of Joeys.  See id. (noting that the 
infringer must distribute an unauthorized copy to a member of the public).  The only data 
that changes hands in connection with PTAT and AutoHop is the marking announcement, 
which instructs AutoHop when to begin skipping the commercial breaks.  According to 
Minnick, this announcement does not contain any PTAT recording, but it merely tells the 
Hopper when the commercials, which are not alleged to be protected works, begin and 
end.  Minnick Depo., 24:10-14.  Therefore, because PTAT and AutoHop do not involve 
any actual distribution of unauthorized copies, the Court finds that Fox has not 
established a likelihood of success on the merits of its distribution claim. 
3. Breach of Contract Claims 
Fox also contends that it is likely to succeed on the merits of its claims against  
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Dish for breach of contract.13  The 2002 RTC Agreement grants Dish a nonexclusive 
right to retransmit the Fox broadcast while prohibiting Dish from copying or distributing 
the copyrighted works, Shull Decl., ¶ 11, Exh. 3 at ¶ 3(a).  The 2010 Letter Agreement 
requires Dish to disable fast-forward functioning during the playback of certain VOD 
features.  Id., ¶ 14, Exh. 5, Attach. A at ¶ 9.14 
 A written contract must be read and interpreted as a whole.15  See Westmoreland 
Coal Co. v. Entech, Inc., 100 N.Y.2d 352, 357 (N.Y. 2003).  A contract must be 
construed to effectuate the parties’ intent, MBIA Ins. Corp. v. Patriarch Partners VIII, 
L.L.C., 842 F. Supp. 2d 682, 704 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), but the Court looks to the “objective 
examination of the reasonable meaning of the text” rather than rely on a party’s 
“subjective expectations or assumptions,” Sea Shipping Inc. v. Half Moon Shipping, 
L.L.C., 848 F. Supp. 2d 448, 457 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).  Additionally, contracts should be 
interpreted according to “reasonable expectation and purpose of the ordinary 
                                                                 
13 The Court notes that, because contract breach is generally compensable by money damages, a 
preliminary injunction will rarely issue on the basis of an alleged breach of contract absent evidence of 
intangible injuries that may stem from such breach.  See Rent-A-Center, Inc. v. Canyon Television and 
Appliance Rental, Inc., 944 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting that “economic injury alone does not 
support a finding of irreparable harm, because such injury can be remedied by a damage award,” but 
intangible injuries that may also arise out of a contractual breach may constitute irreparable harm).  With 
that stricture in mind, the Court will examine Fox’s likelihood of success on the breach of contract 
claims. 
14 Fox also alleges that Dish’s conduct violates the anti-circumvention provision of the 2010 
Letter Agreement, which provides that neither party shall “take any action whatsoever intended to 
frustrate or circumvent, or attempt to frustrate or circumvent” the parties’ contractual obligations.  Shull 
Decl., ¶ 14, Exh. 5, Attach. A at ¶ 5.  The parties devote minimal argument to this claim in their briefs 
and the record lacks substantial evidence addressing this particular provision.  In any event, on the 
current record, Fox has failed to show, even if serious questions exist as to Dish’s potential breach of 
this clause, that any irreparable harm would result.  See Pyro Speculators North, Inc. v Souza, 861 F. 
Supp. 2d 1079, 1092 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (economic injury alone will not support a finding of irreparable 
harm). 
15 According to Clause 30 of the parties’ 2004 Agreement, the parties’ contractual relationship is 
governed by New York law.  See Shull Decl., Exh. 4, ¶ 30.  
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business[person] when making an ordinary business contract.”  Uribe v. Merchants Bank 
of N.Y., 91 N.Y.S.2d 393, 396 (N.Y. 1998). 
a. The RTC Agreement 
Fox asserts that PTAT violates two provisions of the RTC Agreement.  Shull 
Decl., Exh 3, ¶ 3(d) (“[Dish] shall have no right to distribute all or any portion of the 
programming . . . on an interactive, time-delayed, [VOD] or similar basis; provided that 
Fox acknowledges that the foregoing shall not restrict [Dish’s] practice of connecting its 
Subscribers’ video replay equipment . . . .”); ¶ 9(a) (“[Dish] shall not, for pay or 
otherwise, record, copy, duplicate and/or authorize the recording, copying, duplication 
(other than by consumers for private home use) . . . of any portion of” the broadcast.).  As 
discussed above, see § III.A.2.b., supra, Fox has not established that Dish engages in any 
distribution because the PTAT copies are made by users, remain in private homes, and do 
not change hands.  Nevertheless, to the extent that both of these provisions may apply to 
PTAT, it seems clear to the Court that this language invokes the long-recognized rule, set 
forth in Sony, 464 U.S. at 454-55, that in-home copying by private consumers for the 
purpose of “time-shifting” is a fair use under the Copyright Act.  As discussed above, 
although Dish exercises some discretion over the PTAT recording feature, it is ultimately 
the user who causes each copy to be made.  For the same reasons that Dish does not make 
the PTAT copies under copyright standards, the Court finds that Dish does not make the 
copies within the meaning of sections 3(d) and 9(a) of the RTA Agreement.  See Shull 
Decl., Exh. 3, ¶¶ 3(d), 9(a).  Although PTAT makes copying for private home use faster, 
easier, and more expansive, it is ultimately user-initiated copying that is permissible 
under the contract.   
On the other hand, as discussed above, the AutoHop QA copies unquestionably do 
constitute copies—made by Dish.  The fact that the copies are not used for any purpose 
other than quality assurance does not subject them to any exception in the RTC 
Agreement, because the Agreement prohibits copying “for pay or otherwise.”  Shull 
Decl., Exh. 3, ¶ 9(a).  A plain reading of this section in the context of the contract as a 
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whole suggests that the QA copies constitute a breach of the contract by the plain fact 
that they are Dish-initiated copies.  See Brad H. v. City of New York, 17 N.Y.3d 180, 185 
(N.Y. 2011) (“A written contract that is clear, complete and subject to only one 
reasonable interpretation must be enforced according to the plain meaning of the 
language chosen by the contracting parties.”).  Thus, the Court finds that Fox has 
established a likelihood of success on the merits that the AutoHop QA copies violate the 
RTC Agreement. 
  b. The 2010 Letter Agreement 
Additionally, the 2010 Letter Agreement lists several types of VOD services that 
correspond to several Fox stations:  FX, National Geographic Channel (NGC), National 
Geographic en Español (NGE), and Fox VOD.  Shull Decl., ¶ 14, Exh. 5, Attach. A at 
¶ 9.  The sub-clause corresponding to each station grants Dish a license to provide VOD 
content at no additional fee or charge, subject to the limitation that “Dish will disable 
fast-forward functionality during all advertisements.”  Id.  This limitation applies to the 
VOD license for all four stations contemplated in the VOD section.  Id. 
AutoHop indisputably constitutes ad-skipping.  In fact, evidence in the record 
shows that Dish’s marketing campaign highlights the Hopper’s ad-skipping abilities to 
distinguish it from other STBs.  See Singer Decl., ¶ 42, Exh. J (noting Dish’s AutoHop 
tagline, “Watch shows, not commercials”).16  Dish maintains that AutoHop does not 
breach the contract for two reasons.  First, Dish argues that PTAT is not VOD but rather 
is akin to traditional DVR, and therefore AutoHop is permitted under the contract much 
like fast-forwarding and 30-second skip in traditional user-initiated DVR recordings.  See 
Shull Decl., Exh 3, ¶¶ 3(d), 9(a) (allowing private home recording without restriction on 
fast-forward functioning).  Second, Dish submits that the VOD provision was an option 
of which Dish was unable to take advantage due to technological and logistical 
                                                                 
16 See Footnote 13, supra. 
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limitations, see Shull Decl., ¶ 23, and therefore the restriction on fast-forwarding does not 
apply to PTAT.   
If PTAT is, as Fox asserts, a VOD offering, then Dish’s breach seems clear:  every 
mention of VOD content involving the Fox Programs in the Agreement includes the 
express prohibition on fast-forwarding through commercials.  Shull Decl., ¶ 14, Exh. 5, 
Attach. A at ¶ 9; see also Uribe v. Merchants Bank of N.Y., 91 N.Y.S.2d 393, 396 (1998) 
(contracts should be interpreted according to the “reasonable expectation and purpose of 
the ordinary business[person] when making an ordinary business contract”) (internal 
quotation omitted).  The parties devote much argument to the proper definition of VOD.  
According to Richard Rapp, an economist at NERA Economic Consulting, VOD is 
a licensed service that allows viewers to select and watch video programs 
whenever they request them.  It is a service where the content is not 
broadcast, but stored in a library, which users can access on-demand.  
Typical VOD content offerings include recently aired television programs 
(as in catch-up TV), popular series, selected categories of thematic 
programming (e.g. music, children’s programs), and movies. 
Declaration of Richard Rapp, ¶ 94 [Doc. # 64].  Brennan describes the VOD that Fox 
separately licenses to MVPD service providers like Dish as “a library of previously-aired 
television programs for immediate, ‘on demand’ viewing on standard television . . . 
distributed after a short-window following a program’s original air date and time . . . .”  
Brennan Decl., ¶ 14(a).  Other definitions in the record suggest that the essence of VOD 
is that its content is controlled by the provider, not the user:  the provider selects what 
programs will be available, when, and for how long.  See, e.g., Khemkha Decl., ¶ 12 
(offering three descriptions of VOD, all of which involve content offered by the 
supplier).   
 The parties’ dispute over the VOD provision is especially challenging because 
PTAT is, in some ways, a hybrid of DVR and VOD likely not contemplated by either 
party when the 2010 Agreement was drafted.  As the Court concluded in its copyright 
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analysis, however, at its core, PTAT is little more than a faster, more streamlined way for 
users to engage in the time-shifting privileges that they have enjoyed since the days of the 
Betamax.17  As discussed above, Dish does not decide what programs are available in the 
PTAT “library”; rather, if the user chooses to enable PTAT, then the recording includes 
whatever happened to air during that particular primetime window.  Unlike VOD, a user 
cannot decide on Wednesday that he or she wants to view a program that aired on 
Monday; if the user did not enable PTAT for that night, the recording does not exist.  The 
PTAT recording also differs from VOD insofar as it resides on the user’s local DVR and 
is not transmitted from a remote supplier’s library of collected works.  Accordingly, the 
Court finds that the current record does not support a likelihood of success on the merits 
of Fox’s claim that AutoHop breaches the 2010 Letter Agreement.  Because none of the 
parties’ agreements purport to limit fast-forwarding on DVR recordings, and because the 
Court has found that PTAT is more akin to DVR than to VOD, the Court cannot find that 
AutoHop violates the VOD provisions of the 2010 Agreement.  Westmoreland Coal Co. 
v. Entech, Inc., 100 N.Y.2d at 357 (“A written contract will be read as a whole, and every 
part will be interpreted with reference to the whole.”) (internal quotation omitted).     
B. Fox Has Not Established That It Will Suffer Irreparable Harm As a Result of 
the QA Copies 
Although historically a showing of a reasonable likelihood of success on a 
copyright infringement claim raised a presumption of irreparable harm, that presumption 
no longer exists.  See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 392-93, 547 U.S. 
388, 126 S. Ct. 1837, 164 L. Ed. 2d 641 (2006) (rejecting the rule that “an injunction 
automatically follows a determination that a copyright has been infringed” and finding 
                                                                 
17 That former Dish attorney, Max Gratton, represented PTAT as VOD in Dish’s trademark 
“Intent to Use” application on February 4, 2011, does not alter the Court’s finding.  See Singer Decl., 
¶ 28, Exh. F at 207 [Doc. # 41-2].  As the above analysis demonstrates, the exact meaning of the term 
“VOD” is subject to reasonable dispute.  The Court’s conclusion in this regard is based on PTAT’s 
actual characteristics and functionality, not on how PTAT has been described in the media or otherwise.  
Case 2:12-cv-04529-DMG-SH   Document 118    Filed 11/07/12   Page 30 of 33   Page ID
 #:3566
 -31- 
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
that the circuit court’s application of that “categorical rule” to grant an injunction was 
improper); see also Winter, 555 U.S. at 22 (emphasizing that a party seeking a 
preliminary injunction must demonstrate that irreparable injury is likely); Flexible 
Lifeline Sys., Inc. v. Precision Lift, Inc., 654 F.3d 989, 995-996 (9th Cir. 2011) 
(“presuming irreparable harm in a copyright infringement case is inconsistent with, and 
disapproved by, the Supreme Court’s opinions in eBay and Winter”).  Therefore, Fox 
must make an independent showing that it is likely to suffer irreparable harm as a result 
of the infringement via the QA copies if an injunction does not issue.  See Flexible 
Lifeline, 654 F.3d at 998. 
Fox has demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of its claims that 
AutoHop’s QA copies infringe its exclusive reproduction right and breach the anti-
copying terms of the RTC Agreement.  Importantly, as discussed above, neither the 
marking announcements nor the ad-skipping effect of AutoHop implicates any copyright 
interest or breach of contract on the current record.18  Therefore, Fox must establish that it 
faces a likelihood of irreparable harm if Dish is not enjoined from making and using the 
QA copies.   
As discussed above, see § III.A.2.b.ii.d., supra, the record shows that the QA 
copies have an inherent value for which other providers pay through licensing agreements 
with Fox.  See Singer Decl., ¶ 34, Exh. G (“[T]he networks’ growing willingness to offer 
their content on . . . Hulu and iTunes . . . makes the programming that Dish is paying for 
less valuable, Shull said, and that was one of the reasons that it pushed its AutoHop 
device.”).  By making the copies without such a licensing agreement, Dish has reserved 
for itself the benefits that flow from the copies, in this case, the functioning of AutoHop, 
                                                                 
18 Fox does not argue that ad-skipping, standing alone, constitutes copyright infringement, and 
the Court cannot find any case that has addressed such a technology.  Cf. Paramount Pictures Corp. v. 
ReplayTV, 298 F. Supp. 2d 921, 927 (C.D. Cal 2004) (dismissing declaratory suit by private users of 
DVR with commercial-skipping technology after copyright owners signed a covenant not to sue on that 
basis).  Moreover, the Court is persuaded that, to the extent ad-skipping may implicate any copyright 
concerns, Dish is not liable for that potential infringement under Sony, 544 U.S. at 455-56.   
Case 2:12-cv-04529-DMG-SH   Document 118    Filed 11/07/12   Page 31 of 33   Page ID
 #:3567
 -32- 
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
while depriving Fox of its ability to negotiate terms and cost of use in a licensing 
agreement for those copies.  See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 592 (explaining that the relevant 
market for potential derivative uses “includes only those that creators of original works 
would in general develop or license others to develop”) (emphasis added).  Accordingly, 
the Court finds that, on the current record, Dish’s impermissible copying of the Fox 
Programs causes Fox some degree of harm. 
An injunction will not issue, however, unless the record establishes that this harm 
is irreparable.  See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, 508 F.3d at 1158.  Economic injury 
alone will not support a finding of irreparable harm because it can generally be remedied 
by money damages.  See Pyro Speculators North, Inc. v Souza, 861 F. Supp. 2d 1079, 
1092 (E.D. Cal, 2012) (citing Rent-A-Center, Inc., 944 F.2d at 603).  Although 
“intangible injuries, such as damages to ongoing recruitment efforts and goodwill, qualify 
as irreparable harm,” id., the current record does not support a finding of such injuries.  
Instead, the record suggests that the extent of harm caused by the QA copies is calculable 
in money damages.  The fact that Fox has licensing agreements with other companies 
shows that copies of the Fox Programs have a market value that other companies already 
pay in exchange for the right to use the copies.  Although Fox has submitted evidence 
that some irreparable harms, such as loss of control over its copyrighted works and loss 
of advertising revenue, may stem from the ad-skipping use to which the QA copies are 
put, the record does not show that those harms flow from the QA copies themselves.  
MySpace, Inc. v. Wallace, 498 F. Supp. 2d 1293, 1306 n.3 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (noting that 
the irreparable harm inquiry is dependent on “the harm suffered as a result of the 
defendant’s allegedly unlawful actions”).  Rather, if those harms were to materialize, they 
would be a result of the ad-skipping itself, which does not constitute any copyright or 
contract breach.  Because the alleged harms that Fox will suffer as a result of the QA 
copies is essentially contractual in nature, the Court finds that the injury is compensable 
with money damages and does not support a finding of irreparable harm.  See Pyro 
Speculators, 861 F. Supp. 2d at 1092.   
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Having determined that Fox has failed to establish that it is likely to suffer 
irreparable harm in the absence of an injunction, the Court need not determine whether 
the balance of hardships tips in Fox’s favor or whether an injunction is in the public 
interest.  See Winter, 55 U.S. at 20.   
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
In light of the foregoing, Fox’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction is DENIED.  
Given that this Order quotes from the parties’ confidential agreements, which have been 
filed under seal, within five days from the date of this Order, the parties will meet and 
confer regarding which portions of this Order, if any, they propose to be redacted such 
that the Court may issue a redacted version of the Order.  The parties shall file a joint 
report with the Court by no later than November 12, 2012 regarding the proposed 
redacted version of the Order. 
 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
 
DATED: November 7, 2012 
 
  
DOLLY M. GEE 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
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